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Good Faith in Contractual Performance and Enforcement – 
Australian Doctrinal Hurdles 
 
 
Bill Dixon 
 
In the ongoing and spirited debate about the relative merits of an obligation of good faith in 
contractual performance and enforcement, widely divergent views have been expressed 
about the appropriateness and content of the putative obligation.  However, relatively less 
time has been devoted to discussion of the sparseness of tools available to facilitate doctrinal 
development and the hurdles necessarily imposed by such limited doctrinal resources.  This 
article seeks to examine the Australian doctrinal position against the backdrop of good faith 
as it finds application in the wider global context. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This article examines the doctrinal tools that have featured in the development of the 
obligation of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement in Australia.  In 
order to place the Australian doctrinal position in context, the article first briefly 
examines good faith in the global context.  Against this global backdrop, it will be 
demonstrated that the relative sparseness of doctrinal tools available in Australia and 
the associated limitations of these tools are proving significant hurdles to the 
coherent development of the good faith obligation in this country. 
 
2.1  Global Context 
 
There is ample justification for the observation that ‘‘good faith’ may be the most 
widely prescribed standard of conduct globally for contracting parties.’1  
 
2.1.1 Civil and Other Jurisdictions2 
 
With its roots in classical Roman law,3 good faith is well recognised in civil 
jurisdictions.  Perhaps the most well-known code provision dealing with the doctrine 
of good faith is article 242 of the German Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesefzbuch) 
(‘BGB’).  Article 242 imposes an obligation of performance according to the 
requirements of good faith (Treu and Glauben),4 common usage being duly taken 
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1  N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract (9th Aust ed, 2008) [10.43]. 
2  In formulating certain material contained in the body of 2.1.1, as it pertains to the German and French 
codes, it is acknowledged that assistance was derived from footnote material contained in the article: E 
Webb, ‘The Scope of the Implied Duty of Good Faith - Lessons from Commercial and Retail Leasing 
Cases’ (2001) 9 APLJ 1, 1 (footnote 2). 
3  E A Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code’ (1963) 30 U Chi L Rev 666, 670.  ‘The principle of good faith as introduced by the 
Romans was refined by the rise of Christianity, development of ecclesiastical courts and the 
development of scholasticism in the 11th-13th centuries.  Thomistic philosophy regards good faith as a 
precept of natural law, and consequently as a precept of all laws, both canon and secular’:  W P Yee, 
‘Protecting Parties’ Reasonable Expectations: A General Principle of Good Faith’ [2001] 1(2) OUCLJ 
195, 195 (footnote 1). 
4  Literally: fidelity and faith: Simon Whittaker and Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Good Faith in European 
Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape’ in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds), 
Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) 7, 18. 
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into consideration.5  Article 242 has been used extensively to imply contractual terms 
and, where the contract is silent, to impose post contractual duties to act in good 
faith.  It is also worth noting that article 242 may be relied upon without the need for it 
to be specifically pleaded.  In these circumstances the judge is called upon to 
determine if contractual performance has been in good faith. 
 
Article 1134(3) of the French Civil Code provides that contracts must be performed in 
good faith.6  Although the French code does not define the term ‘good faith’, article 
1134(3) seems to impose a minimum obligation of honest conduct where duties are 
not prescribed by the contract or by law.  The Italian Civil Code,7 the Greek Civil 
Code,8 Quebec’s Civil Code9 and the Swiss Civil Code10 all impose similar 
obligations.  The Russian Civil Code (2002) further exemplifies the wide influence of 
the good faith obligation.11 
 
Certain Asian countries also use codes based in part on European models.  By way 
of example, a code was adopted in 1999 entitled Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China containing provisions recognising that ‘parties to a transaction 
should act in good faith at every stage of their transactions.’12  In Japan, a general 
obligation is also imposed (by law) on contracting parties to act in good faith.  The 
source of this obligation is article 1(2) of the Japanese Civil Code (kyoko kitei).  This 
mandatory provision requires ‘juristic acts (including contracts) to be exercised in 
accordance with good faith.’13  This approach is consistent with the Japanese 
emphasis on the establishment of long-term relationships, ‘rather than on the 
formation of a single contract document.’14 
 
2.1.2 United States 
 
In the United States a duty of good faith is also recognised in relation to the 
performance and enforcement of contracts.15  The duty, which has been described 
                                                          
5  Under article 157 of the BGB contracts are to be interpreted according to the requirements of good 
faith, with ordinary usage being taken into consideration: ibid. 
6  While the French Civil Code is only expressed to apply to the performance and non-performance of 
contracts, French contract law recognises a general principle of good faith in the creation, performance 
and non-performance of contracts: Whittaker and Zimmermann, above n 4, 32-9. 
7  Amongst other provisions, article 1375 of the Codice Civile provides for contracts to be performed to 
an objective standard of good faith. 
8  It has been noted elsewhere that article 288 of the Greek Civil Code (1940) is a verbatim translation of 
article 242 of the BGB: Whittaker and Zimmermann, above n 4, 49. 
9  Civil Code of Quebec (1990), arts 6, 1375 and 1434. 
10  Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code provides that every person is bound, in exercising their rights and 
fulfilling their duties, to act in accordance with good faith.  The meaning of good faith is an issue for 
the courts; there is no definition. 
11  Finn J, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing and ‘Boats Against the Current’’ (Paper presented at the Second 
Biennial Conference on the Law of Obligations, Melbourne, 16 July 2004) 8. 
12  Wang Liming and Xu Chuanxi, ‘Fundamental Principles of China’s Contract Law’ (1999) 13 Columbia 
Journal of Asian Law 1, 17 as referred to by Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 1, 421. 
13  Lindy Willmott, Sharon Christensen and Des Butler, Contract Law (1st ed, 2001) 277. 
14  E Maloney, ‘Contracts and the Concept of Good Faith’ (1993) 29 ACLN 32, 35. 
15  As noted recently, ‘most American courts accept the notion that parties to a contract have mutual 
obligations of good faith and fair dealing subject to explicit constraints within the contract itself.’: 
Howard Hunter, ‘Good Faith and the Construction of Terms in Commercial Contracts: The American 
Perspective’ (2009) 25 JCL 39, 39. 
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as a cornerstone of American law,16 is recognised in two explicit ways.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as adopted by the American Law Institute17 (‘the 
Restatement’), although not having statutory force, is usually applied as an 
authoritative statement by the American courts.  Section 205 of the Restatement 
provides that every contract ‘imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.’18  This section (which had no 
equivalent in the first Restatement of Contracts) was described in 1982 as ‘one of 
the truly major advances in American contract law during the past fifty years.’19 
 
The Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC’)20 (which all American states, other than 
Louisiana,21 have adopted by legislation)22 also provides for good faith.  This should 
not be seen as surprising given that the ‘great Legal Realist scholar,’23 Karl Llewellyn, 
the chief draftsman of the UCC, was familiar with, and influenced by, German law.24  
In the current edition of the UCC it is stipulated that ‘Every contract or duty within 
[the UCC] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.’25  
Except as otherwise provided in article 5 (letters of credit), ‘good faith’ is defined in 
the UCC to mean honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.26   
 
‘Honesty in fact’ is frequently referred to as the ‘pure heart and empty head’ test as it 
requires only that the actor act honestly - without malice, deceit or ulterior motive.27  
Until the most recent revisions to the UCC,28 ‘honesty in fact’ represented the sole 
extent of the good faith obligation29 and there was some criticism that this 
conceptualisation of good faith was too narrow.30  As noted by Hunter, the explicit 
incorporation of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing within the current 
                                                          
16  E Allan Farnsworth, ‘Ten Questions About Good Faith and Fair Dealing in United States Contract 
Law’ [2002] AMPLA Yearbook 1, 2. 
17  American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). 
18  It should be noted that this provision, like those in the Uniform Commercial Code, only applies to 
contractual performance and enforcement and not to contract negotiation. 
19  R S Summers, ‘The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and Conceptualization’ (1982) 67 
Cornell Law Rev 810, 810. 
20  Before the UCC, a few states of America (notably New York and California) had recognised a common 
law doctrine of good faith performance: E Allan Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith in Contractual Performance’ 
in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 153, 155. 
21  Louisiana has only adopted select parts of the UCC.  This is a reflection of Louisiana’s commercial law 
being based on civil law and the Napoleonic Code rather than common law. 
22  The title to the UCC is a misnomer.  In addition to Louisiana, the UCC is otherwise not uniform as it 
was not enacted by all other states in its entirety and amendments were made by certain states 
following enactment. 
23  R J Mooney, ‘Hands Across the Water: The Continuing Convergence of American and Australian 
Contract Law’ (2000) 23(1) UNSWLJ 1, 25. 
24  Farnsworth, above n 16, 2 (footnote 3). 
25  UCC 1-304. 
26  UCC 1-201(20). 
27  R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 
122. 
28  As approved by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws. 
29  Other than in the case of a merchant involved in the contractual sale of goods. 
30  See, eg, Summers, above n 19, 825. 
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definition is intended to clarify possible areas of confusion under the former version 
of the UCC.31 
 
The distinction made in the UCC between ‘honesty in fact’ and ‘fair dealing’ is a 
significant one and one that is also made elsewhere in the international context.  
Having duly noted this distinction, in the Australian context there is considerable 
merit in the view that the term ‘fair dealing’ subsumes the term ‘good faith’, the 
former being considerably wider in its ambit than the latter.32 
 
2.1.3 International  
 
Good faith is also a fundamental principle of interpretation in the law of international 
sale of goods pursuant to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (‘the Convention’).33  Article 7(1) provides that, in the 
interpretation of the Convention, regard is to be had to, amongst other things, the 
observation of good faith in international trade.34  Legislation in all States and 
Territories of Australia gives the Convention the force of law35 although it remains 
possible for the parties to contractually exclude the Convention’s operation.36 
 
Both article 1.7 of the enlarged second edition37 of Unidroit’s38 Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (‘Unidroit Principles 2004’)39 (which has 
progressively assumed the mantle of the lex mercatoria in international commercial 
dealings)40 and article 1.201 of the Principles of European Contract Law41 provide for 
a general obligation of good faith and fair dealing in contracts and contracting.42  
Although basically the same issues are addressed,43 these two sets of principles will 
usually operate in different domains due to their different scope. 
 
The Unidroit Principles 2004 are not legally binding, being a ‘soft law’ instrument44 
dependent upon adoption by the parties.45  The Unidroit Principles 2004 relate 
                                                          
31  H O Hunter, ‘The Growing Uncertainty About Good Faith in American Contract Law’ (2004) 20 JCL 
50, 50 (footnote 2). 
32  Finn, above n 11, 2. 
33  Ibid 8. 
34  The manner in which good faith is determined under the Convention is discussed by B Zeller, ‘Good 
Faith - Is it a Contractual Obligation?’ (2003) 15 Bond LR 204. 
35  See, eg, Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 (Qld). 
36  Article 6 of the Convention. 
37  The immediate success of the first edition of the Unidroit Principles published in 1994 prompted 
Unidroit as early as 1997 to resume work with a view to a second edition.  The new edition of the 
Unidroit Principles was an enlargement, rather than a revision, of the 1994 edition with the result that 
the number of articles rose from 120 to 185: M J Bonell, ‘Unidroit Principles 2004 - The New Edition 
of the Principles of International Commercial Contracts Adopted by the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law’ [2004] 1 Unif L Rev 5, 5, 19. 
38  The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. 
39  The Unidroit Principles 2004 were unanimously approved by the governing council of Unidroit in 
April 2004.  For further information, refer to Bonell, above n 37. 
40  Finn, above n 11, 2. 
41  The Principles of European Contract Law, prepared by the Commission on European Contract Law, 
were published in three successive volumes: the first in 1995, the second in 2000 and the third in 2003. 
42  P Finn, ‘Equity and Commercial Contracts: A Comment’ [2001] AMPLA Yearbook 414, 418. 
43  Bonell, above n 37, 32. 
44  Ibid 6. 
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specifically to international commercial contracts46 between merchants and other 
professionals with a territorial scope47 that is consequently universal.48  For these 
reasons, the meaning of ‘good faith and fair dealing’ will be construed in the light of 
the special conditions of international trade.49 
 
By contrast, the Principles of European Contract Law are intended to apply to all 
contracts (including consumer contracts)50 but their territorial scope is regional, being 
limited to the member states of the European Union.51  To highlight the differences, in 
an International Chamber of Commerce (‘ICC’) arbitral award, it was pointed out that 
the Principles of European Contract Law constituted an academic work undertaken 
in view of the preparation of a future European Code of Contracts and as such, 
unlike the Unidroit Principles 2004 (and their predecessor, in this instance), were not 
well-known to the international business community.52 
 
Despite these differences and the impact this will have on construing the meaning of 
the good faith requirement, in both sets of principles, the requirement is mandatory, 
being incapable of exclusion or limitation.53  The formula ‘good faith and fair dealing’ 
used in both sets of Principles clearly embodies not one, but two concepts.  This 
proposition is made plain by the commentary in the Principles of European Contract 
Law relating to article 1.201.  Comment E distinguishes the two concepts in the 
following manner: 
 
‘Good faith’ means honesty and fairness in mind, which are subjective concepts.  A person 
should, for instance, not be entitled to exercise a remedy if doing so is of no benefit to him 
and his only purpose is to harm the other party.  ‘Fair dealing’ means observance of fairness 
in fact which is an objective test.54 
 
2.1.4 English Common Law 
 
Despite the widespread international recognition of the good faith obligation, and 
contrary to the view of at least one commentator that the process of 
internationalisation of contract law is inexorable and irreversible,55 it has not yet 
resulted in legal convergence beyond Australia’s shores.  The point is well made by 
Teubner in discussing good faith as a legal irritant in English common law: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
45  As the Governing Council of Unidroit stated in its Introduction to the 1994 edition of the Principles, 
‘[they] are not a binding instrument and … in consequence their acceptance will depend upon their 
persuasive authority … ’: ibid. 
46  As stated in paragraph 1 of the Preamble: ibid 32 (footnote 151). 
47  The declared objective of the Unidroit Principles 2004 as evidenced by the Introduction to the 1994 
first edition was to ‘establish a balanced set of rules designed for use throughout the world.’: ibid 36. 
48  Ibid 32. 
49  Ibid 34. 
50  Principles of European Contract Law, art 1.101. 
51  Bonell, above n 37, 33. 
52  The unpublished 2001 ICC arbitral award is referred to by Bonell, ibid 35. 
53  Unidroit Principles 2004, art 1.7; Principles of European Contract Law, art 1.201. 
54  Finn, above n 11, 2. 
55  Finn, above n 42, 416. 
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Against all expectations that globalisation of the markets and computerisation of the economy 
will lead to a convergence of economic regimes and to a functional equivalence of legal 
norms in responding to their identical problems, the opposite has turned out to be true.56 
 
From the 19th century on57 the English common law was largely resistant to the 
development of a separate good faith obligation.58  In this regard, Brownsword’s 
‘pragmatic thesis’59 would suggest that the English common law already provides 
piecemeal solutions without the need for the application of a good faith obligation or 
principle.60  In the words of Lord Justice Bingham: 
 
In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law world, 
the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in making and 
carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith … English law has, characteristically, 
committed itself to no such overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in 
response to demonstrated problems of unfairness.61 
 
Under Brownsword’s ‘repugnancy thesis’62 good faith is regarded as incompatible 
with an adversarial ethic.  In part, the English approach is explicable due to the 
doctrines and principles of modern contract law being authoritatively established in 
the 19th century63 at which time the common law of contract did not include a general 
duty of good faith.64  Typified by Langdell and Pollock, the 19th century formalists 
employed the notion that the essence of contract is the agreement of wills (or the 
meeting of minds) to craft the classical bargain theory of contract.65  Coinciding with 
the rise of legal positivism (involving a conceptual distinction between law and 
morality)66 and the economic theory of laissez-faire,67 in the mid-to-late 19th century 
clear public policy considerations also underpinned a legal regime in which freedom 
of contract was largely supreme.  Freedom of contract came to be regarded in the 
                                                          
56  G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences’ (1998) 61 MLR 11, 24. 
57  The age of Lord Mansfield is commonly accepted as the high-water mark of common law good faith.  
In Carter v Boehm (1766) 97 ER 1162, 1164 Lord Mansfield made reference to good faith as ‘the 
governing principle … applicable to all contracts and dealings.’  Some reasons have been identified for 
the reaction against good faith at the end of the 19th century: R Harrison, Good Faith in Sales (1997) 7-
9. 
58  By contrast to the common law, in the English statutory regulation of consumer contracts, good faith is 
one factor to be considered in the application of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999 (UK). 
59  R Brownsword, ‘Two Concepts of Good Faith’ (1994) 7 JCL 197, 198. 
60  By the use of specific doctrines such as estoppel, misrepresentation, economic duress, mistake, 
frustration and the like: R Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in 
English Contract Law’ in R Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: 
Concept and Context (1999) 13, 21.  It has been argued by Professor McKendrick that English courts 
prefer to apply specific doctrines, particularly if this generates the same results as the application of 
general principles: as referred to by A Phang, ‘Security of Contract and the Pursuit of Fairness’ (2000) 
16 JCL 158, 185-186. 
61  Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433, 439. 
62  Brownsword, above n 59, 198. 
63  J W Carter and M P Furmston, ‘Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part 1’ (1994) 
JCL 1, 1. 
64  Ibid 3. 
65  C J Goetz and R E Scott, ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’ (1980) 89 
Yale Law Journal 1261, 1263 (footnote 15). 
66  Bentham and his positivist followers valued certainty and predictability above all else: H K Lucke, 
‘Good Faith and Contractual Performance’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (1987) 155, 157. 
67  Yee, above n 3, 195. 
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19th century as the cornerstone of liberty and an essential ingredient of social 
order:68 
 
The freedom and the sanctity of contract were the necessary instrument of laissez-faire, and it 
was the function of courts to foster the one and to vindicate the other.  Where a man sowed, 
there should he be able to reap.69 
 
Notwithstanding the mesmerising quality of the sanctity of contracts in the 19th 
century,70 inevitably public policy considerations do change over time and the rise 
and fall of freedom of contract as a basic tenet have been well illustrated.71  The 
movement in the common law from rules to standards has been described in 
different ways by different commentators.  For example, Atiyah described the trend 
as being from ‘principles to pragmatism’ while Treitel described it as being from 
‘doctrine to discretion’.72  Notwithstanding this trend, separate recognition of the good 
faith obligation has not occurred under English common law.  While good faith 
concepts have assumed significance in directives of the European Parliament and of 
the Council73 and good faith may have a role to play as an implied term74 limiting75 
the operation of a contractual power or discretion,76 there remains no general 
principle of good faith in the English common law of contract.77 
 
3.1 Australia 
 
Having briefly surveyed good faith as it is relevant in a global context, it is 
appropriate to consider the extent of judicial expectations of good faith in the 
                                                          
68  An observation made by H Collins, ‘The Sanctimony of Contract’ in R Rawlings (ed), Law, Society 
and Economy, Centenary Essays for the London School of Economics and Political Science 1895-1995 
(1997) 63, 66. 
69  M P Furmston (ed), Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract (14th ed, 2001) 18. 
70  Collins, above n 68, 81. 
71  See, eg, G Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974); P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract (1979) 716ff.  For a contrasting American view (suggesting that there has not been a general 
reduction in freedom of contract on a historical basis) see M Pettit, ‘Freedom, Freedom of Contract, 
and the ‘Rise and Fall’’ (1999) 79 Boston Univ LR 263. 
72  As referred to by Anthony J Duggan, ‘Is Equity Efficient?’ (1997) 113 LQR 601, 629. 
73  Such as the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive of 1993 (Council Directive 1993/13/EC of 
5 April 1993), Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (implementing the 1993 
Directive), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive of 2005 (Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 
May 2005) and the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (implementing the 
2005 directive). 
74  The implication being made as a matter of fact. 
75  In a manner analogous to the Wednesbury (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223) rationality test. 
76  Although it is clear that even in this context, the English common law will not imply a term that a 
contractual power or discretion must be exercised in an objectively reasonable manner: Jani-King (GB) 
Ltd v Pula Enterprises Ltd [2008] 1 All ER 451, 466-467.  For further discussion of the implied duty of 
good faith in relation to express contractual rights and discretions and certain English decisions 
(including Socimer International Bank Ltd v Standard Bank Ltd [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 558), see 
Elisabeth Peden, ‘Implicit Good Faith – or Do We Still Need an Implied Term of Good Faith?’ (2009) 
25 JCL 50. 
77  Simon Whittaker, ‘The Relationship of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to European and 
National Contract Laws’ in Stephen Weatherill and Ulf Bernitz (eds), The Regulation of Unfair 
Commercial Practices Under EC Directive 2005/29 (2007) 139, 156. 
8 
 
performance and enforcement of Australian contracts78 and the doctrinal 
underpinning of such expectations.  Unlike certain other jurisdictions canvassed, 
Australia does not have the benefit of a civil79 or commercial code, a Restatement, 
overarching principles or the like.80  In short, in the development of a good faith 
obligation, Australia has suffered from a sparseness of doctrinal tools.81 
 
Despite some academic commentators calling for good faith to be regarded as a tool 
of construction,82 this approach has not found favour, indeed has received often 
sharply critical rejection by the judiciary as being at odds with the present state of the 
law in Australia.83  Unlike some jurisdictions84 where ‘fiduciary law has been distorted 
to this end’,85 the Australian vehicle for judicial development of a good faith obligation 
has been the implied contractual term.86 
 
3.1.1 An Implied Term Approach 
 
When considering the potential implication of a good faith obligation in the 
performance and enforcement of contracts, it is important to recognise the operation 
of two categories of implied terms that are potentially quite disparate.87  Consistent 
with the classical model of contract law,88 in the first category are implied terms that 
reflect the presumed intention of the parties.  These terms are commonly described 
as being implied ‘in fact’,89 the implication being made ad hoc. 
 
By contrast with the first category, the second category of implied term is based on 
imputed intention.90  Imposed on the contractual parties by law, terms falling within 
this category are commonly described as being implied ‘as a matter of law’ such that 
the contractual term is implied as a legal incident of a particular class of contract.91  
The label ‘default rules’ is a further description commonly adopted in discussing 
                                                          
78  In 1995 the Hon A M Gleeson observed that the law was entering upon areas of human conduct that 
had hitherto been regarded as being of purely moral or social concern: A M Gleeson, ‘Individualised 
Justice - The Holy Grail’ (1995) 69 ALJ 421, 425. 
79  The need for implied terms is reduced in civil law jurisdictions due to the existence of general concepts 
of good faith: Yee, above n 3, 203. 
80  It has been noted by Finn J that we do not have ‘a common informing principle which shapes and 
directs our doctrines.’: Finn, above n 11, 9. 
81  Ibid 5.  In a judicial setting, Finn J makes a similar comment in GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP 
Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 1, [919]. 
82  See, eg., Elisabeth Peden, ‘Implicit Good Faith – or Do We Still Need an Implied Term of Good 
Faith?’ (2009) 25 JCL 50. 
83  See, eg., Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovation Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [206]; Insight Oceania Pty 
Ltd v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd [2008] NSWSC 710, [173]. 
84  Particularly Canada and the United States: P Finn, ‘Commerce, the Common Law and Morality’ (1989) 
17 MULR 87, 96 (footnote 72). 
85  Ibid 96. 
86  Notwithstanding the criticism of those who call for good faith to be regarded as a tool of construction 
that the implied term approach is a retrograde step: JW Carter, Elisabeth Peden and GJ Tolhurst, 
Contract Law in Australia, 5th ed, 2007, 21. 
87  This is not to suggest that there may not be considerable overlap between the two categories as 
demonstrated by the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices 
Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1. 
88  Based on the intentions of the parties to the contract. 
89  Lindy Willmott, Sharon Christensen, Des Butler and Bill Dixon, Contract Law (3rd ed, 2009) 242. 
90  Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 103. 
91  Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104, 122-123. 
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implied terms of this type.92  Of the two categories, terms implied as a matter of law 
are a relative newcomer with a distinction between the two categories only clearly 
emerging in the 1950s.93 
 
This distinction between the two categories of implied terms, namely terms implied in 
fact and terms implied as a matter of law, is of considerable significance when 
considering the evolution of the implied obligation of good faith in the performance 
and enforcement of contracts in Australia.  Given this significance, before examining 
the evolution of the implied obligation of good faith in Australia, it is appropriate to 
further examine the requirement for the two categories of implication. 
 
3.1.3 Implication as a Matter of Law 
 
As mentioned, if a contractual term is implied ‘as a matter of law’ the term is implied 
as a legal incident of a particular class of contract.94  For implication to occur, a two 
stage test must be satisfied.95  The first requirement is that there is an identifiable 
class of contractual relationship.  Traditionally, specific terms have been implied as a 
matter of law into contracts of a certain class.  Examples include contracts between 
employer/employee (implied term not to disclose secret processes), contracts for the 
sale of goods (implied terms of reasonable fitness and merchantable quality and that 
payment and delivery of goods are concurrent obligations),96 contracts of lease 
between landlord and tenant (implied term that premises will be reasonably fit for 
habitation) and in contracts of carriage by sea (an implied term of seaworthiness).97  
Notwithstanding these traditional classes, it is clear that the classes of contracts in 
which the law will imply terms is not closed.98 
 
The second requirement is to satisfy the test of necessity.99  This test emanates from 
what is regarded as the authoritative decision on the test for implication of terms in 
law (both in England and Australia),100 Liverpool City Council v Irwin.101  In this well-
known decision, the issue for determination by the House of Lords was whether the 
Council, as landlord, was under any implied obligation to maintain and repair the 
common parts of the building which were in the Council’s control.  In a speech often 
cited as describing the test to be satisfied (if a term were to be implied, as a matter of 
law), Lord Wilberforce102 opined that ‘such obligation should be read into the contract 
as the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires, no more, no less: a test, in other 
                                                          
92  See, eg, See E Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (2003) 111. 
93  Commencing with the decision of the House of Lords in Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. Ltd 
[1957] AC 555.  Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 remains the decision that is most 
frequently cited for the definitive test for implication of contractual terms, as a matter of law, both in 
English and Australian authorities. 
94  Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104, 122-123. 
95  A Phang, ‘Implied Terms in English Law - Some Recent Developments’ [1993] JBL 242, 245-246. 
96  Now codified by statute: see, eg, Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld). 
97  Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 448; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & 
United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468, 487; Glanville Williams, ‘Language and the Law’ 
(1945) 61 LQR 403 as referred to in Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, [165]. 
98  Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468, 487 (Hope JA). 
99  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10, 30 (Mason CJ). 
100  Albeit a decision which remains confusing given its myriad treatment of both the test and its 
application: Peden, above n 92, 70. 
101  [1977] AC 239. 
102  With whom Lord Fraser agreed: [1977] AC 239, 270. 
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words of necessity.’103  Applying this test, Lord Wilberforce held that there was an 
implied term whereby the landlord Council was obliged to take reasonable care to 
keep these areas in reasonable repair.104 
 
From subsequent Australian cases it is apparent that ‘necessity’ is commonly 
understood to mean that ‘unless such a term be implied, the enjoyment of the rights 
conferred by the contract would or could be rendered nugatory, worthless, or, 
perhaps, be seriously undermined.’105  Notwithstanding this common formulation, a 
wider conception of the test of necessity is also apparent in certain decisions.  In 
these instances, wider policy reasons have been seen to support the implication of a 
contractual term as a matter of law.106  That said, it has been recognised that the 
narrower conception of the test of necessity will address ‘the broad range of 
instances where the issue of such an implication ordinarily arises.’107  The narrower 
conception of the test of necessity is adopted in this article.  To the extent that the 
implication of a contractual term can be justified under this narrower conception, the 
implication can be seen to be in strict accordance with the commonly accepted 
requirements of existing Australian contractual doctrine. 
 
3.1.4 Implication as a Matter of Fact 
 
An implication as a matter of fact may be made on a number of grounds.108  In the 
good faith context, a term may be implied in fact109 in order to provide business 
efficacy to the operation of the contract.  The Privy Council in BP Refinery 
(Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings110 set out the five requirements111 to be 
satisfied to enable the implication of a term on the basis of business efficacy.112  The 
five requirements, which will apply where the contract is a formal one,113 are: 
                                                          
103  [1977] AC 239, 254. 
104  Ibid 256. 
105  Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 450 (McHugh and Gummow JJ); Breen v 
Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 103 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ), 124 (Gummow J).  An alternative way 
of describing the test of necessity is whether the term sought to be implied is necessary in contracts of 
the class to which the subject contract belongs in the sense that, without it, the whole basis of the 
contracts in the class would be rendered futile: Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries 
Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468, 488 (Hope JA, Samuels and Priestley JJA agreeing). 
106  Policy reasons have been expressly articulated in the past, see, eg, Lister v Romford Ice [1957] AC 555, 
576-579; Simonius Vischer & Co Holt & Thompson [1979] 2 NSWLR 322, 348.  In the specific context 
of an implied obligation of good faith, Finn J has expressly acknowledged that considerations of public 
policy can and do have an overt role to play in some instances: Hughes Aircraft Systems International v 
Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1, 39. 
107  Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1, 39. 
108  A term may be implied to provide a contract with business efficacy; a term may be implied from a 
previous consistent course of dealings; a term may be implied from custom or usage or a term may be 
implied to complete a contract: Willmott, Christensen, Butler and Dixon, above n 89, 240. 
109  For discussion of the difficulties that may arise with implication in fact:  See Peden, above n 92, 
chapter four. 
110 (1977) 180 CLR 266. 
111  As noted by Tadgell JA in Narni Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank [2001] VSCA 31, [16] (with whose 
reasons Buchanan and Chernov JJA agreed) these five requirements, although expressed to operate 
cumulatively, may nevertheless overlap. 
112  This approach has subsequently been approved by the High Court in a number of decisions, probably 
the most well-known being Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales 
(1982) 149 CLR 337. 
113  Where the contract is informal or incomplete, the test for implication is whether it is necessary for the 
reasonable or effective operation of the contract in the circumstances: Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd 
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 The term must be reasonable and equitable; 
 
 The term must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that 
no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; 
 
 The term must be so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’;114 
 
 The term must be capable of clear expression; and  
 
 The term must not contradict any express term of the contract.115 
 
3.1.5 Evolution of the Implied Good Faith Obligation in Australia 
 
As is well-known, the starting point of the implied good faith obligation in contractual 
performance and enforcement was the judgment of Priestley JA in Renard 
Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (‘Renard’).116  Given the depth 
of treatment that this seminal case has already received elsewhere, I only wish to 
comment briefly on the unfortunate starting point that the case constituted in a 
doctrinal sense. 
 
The unfortunate doctrinal by-product of Renard117 was the uncertainty engendered as 
to the basis on which the term was being implied.  Was good faith being implied as a 
matter of fact, a matter of law, some form of hybrid implication of both fact and law or 
could it potentially be justified on both bases?  Priestley JA justified his conclusion, in 
part, on business efficacy grounds and also suggested a hybrid implication of fact 
and law on the basis that there was no real difference between these types of 
implication.118 
 
The uncertainty apparent in Renard119 continued for the better part of a decade (until 
circa 2001) with a variety of judicial approaches to implication of a good faith 
obligation.  For example, in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices 
Australia120 when Finn J implied a term of good faith and fair dealing the term was 
implied as a matter of both fact and law.  In a small number of reported instances the 
implication was made, or treated, as a matter of fact alone.121  In addition to this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1995) 185 CLR 410, 422, 442; Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 123-124; Associated Alloys Pty 
Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 74 ALJR 862, 873.  Generally, see G Tolhurst and J W Carter, 
‘The New Law on Implied Terms’ (1996) 11 JCL 76; M Bryan and M P Ellinghaus, ‘Before the High 
Court Fault Lines in the Law of Obligations: Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2000) 
22 Syd LR 636.  On the differences for formal and informal contracts see, eg, J W Carter and G 
Tolhurst, ‘Implied Terms: Refining the New Law’ (1997) 12 JCL 152. 
114  Employing the standard of the ‘officious bystander’.  For academic suggestion that the time has come 
for the officious bystander to be given a ‘decent burial’ refer to Bryan and Ellinghaus, above n 113, 
647. 
115  BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266, 283. 
116  (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
117  Ibid. 
118  Ibid 263. 
119  Ibid. 
120  (1997) 146 ALR 1. 
121  See, eg, Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264; Dalcon Constructions Pty Ltd v State 
Housing Commission (1998) 14 BCLC 477.  In Saxby Bridge Mortgages Pty Ltd v Saxby Bridge Pty 
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variety of judicial approach, there were instances where the basis of implication was 
open to considerable doubt.  It is suggested, with respect, that the decision of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal in Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella122 falls squarely 
in this category.  At least one commentator agrees, having labelled the basis of 
implication in this instance as ‘completely ambiguous’.123  Similarly, in Burger King 
Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd (‘Burger King’),124 the implication was said to be made 
as a matter of law but analysis of the language employed by the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal appears to be more consistent with an implication as a matter of 
fact.125 
 
Notwithstanding a degree of inconsistency and ambiguity evident in decisions up 
until then, from circa 2001 to 2004 the Australian judiciary was more likely (although 
not without exception)126 to approach the task of potential implication of an obligation 
of good faith in contractual performance and enforcement as being a matter of law, 
rather than fact.127  In Burger King128 the New South Wales Court of Appeal129 noted, 
with approval, that there was an increasing acceptance that if a term of good faith 
was to be implied, that it was to be implied as a matter of law.130  The Court of Appeal 
went on to note that decisions which did not adopt this approach should be regarded 
as standing on their own.131 
 
During this period of time, while the debate (and division) apparent in the immediate 
aftermath of Renard132 still continued,133 it had appeared to be dissipating.  A more 
consistent (albeit not uniform)134 pattern seemed to be emerging with a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ltd [2000] NSWSC 433, Simos J rejected the implication of a term of good faith on the basis that the 
requirements for implication ad hoc were not satisfied.  Simos J did not consider the possibility of 
implication, as a matter of law. 
122  (1998) 44 NSWLR 349. 
123  Peden, above n 92, 131. 
124  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
125  Contrary to the approach that would be expected where a term is implied as a matter of law, the Court 
of Appeal investigated whether a term should be implied in the particular contract that was before it, 
rather than making an implication as an incident of a defined class of contract.  The unusual nature of 
this approach was noted by Gzell J in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Spira (2002) 174 FLR 274, 
[145] and by the New South Wales Court of Appeal itself in a later decision, Vodafone Pacific Ltd v 
Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [190].  A similar criticism may be made of the approach of 
Burchett J in News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 33. 
126  See, eg, Saxby Bridge Mortgages Pty Ltd v Saxby Bridge Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 433; Linfox 
Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ellul [2004] NSWSC 276, [52]-[54]. 
127  The judicial approach adopted in Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187; Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty 
Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-703; Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd 
[2004] NSWCA (Sheller, Giles and Ipp JJA) 15 and Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v 
Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 288. 
128  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
129  Sheller, Beazley and Stein JJA. 
130  Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, [164]. 
131  Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, [161]. 
132  (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
133  Academic reservations continue.  See, eg, Adrian Baron, “Good Faith’ and Construction Contracts – 
From Small Acorns Large Oaks Grow’ (2002) 22 Aust Bar Rev 54; J W Carter and E Peden, ‘Good 
Faith in Australian Contract Law’ (2003) 19 JCL 155. 
134  For examples of judicial reluctance to imply a term of good faith refer to Laurelmont Pty Ltd v 
Stockdale & Leggo (Qld) Pty Ltd [2001] QCA 212; Playcorp Pty Ltd v Taiyo Kogyo Ltd [2003] VSC 
108.  The Full Federal Court has previously noted that the issue remained to be determined by the High 
Court: Wenzel v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd [2002] FCAFC 400, [81]. 
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Australian courts (lower in the judicial hierarchy) being prepared to hold directly, 
tacitly accept or assume (without making a final determination)135 that good faith was 
implied, as a matter of law,136 in the performance and enforcement of a very broad 
class of contract, namely, commercial contracts per se.137  Although there was 
perhaps reason to question the broadness of this approach,138 the approach was 
nevertheless reflected in certain decisions of the Federal Court,139 the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal,140 certain decisions of the Supreme Courts of Victoria141 and 
Western Australia142 and had crept into pleadings in commercial matters in 
Queensland.143 
 
Unfortunately, during this time the High Court had not (and still has not) participated 
in the good faith debate.  In Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South 
Sydney City Council144 an opportunity arose.  The High Court was called upon to 
construe a clause in a long-term lease to determine a variation in rental.  Both 
parties to the litigation accepted that the landlord’s power to determine rent was both 
subject to an obligation of, and exercised in, good faith.  Due to this concession, the 
particular issue was treated as simply one of construction of the express lease 
terms.145  The majority,146 while acknowledging the ‘debate in various Australian 
authorities concerning the existence and content’ of an implied obligation of good 
faith in contractual performance and in the exercise of contractual rights and powers, 
did not consider it an appropriate occasion to determine these issues.147  Kirby and 
Callinan JJ also did not consider it necessary to address the good faith issue. 
 
In 2005, the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Esso Australia Resources 
Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL148 seemed to signal the adoption of a new 
doctrinal twist in the ongoing development of the good faith obligation.  To the extent 
that this decision and later like decisions highlight potential difficulties with 
                                                          
135  See, eg, the Supreme Court of Western Australia Full Court in Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda 
Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94, [13], [55] and the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Vodafone 
Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [191]. 
136  Finn, above n 42, 418. 
137  Even such an advocate of the contractual obligation of good faith as Finn J would not suggest that 
Australian law has yet committed itself to the wider proposition that the implied obligation is 
applicable to all contracts: South Sydney District Rugby League Football Ltd v News Ltd (2000) 177 
ALR 611, [393]. 
138  As subsequently discussed. 
139  See, eg, South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 661, 
[393-394]; Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 288, [64]. 
140  See, eg, Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 [159]; Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd 
[2004] NSWCA 15, [191]. 
141  See, eg, Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonalds Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310, [120]; Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia v Renstell Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 167, [47]; Varangian v OFM Capital 
Limited [2003] VSC 444, [179]; Golden Sands Pty Ltd v Davegale Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 458, [39]; Esso 
Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2004] VSC 477, [130]. 
142  See, eg, Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94, [13], [55]. 
143  See, eg, Elfic Ltd v Macks [2000] QSC 18, [109]; Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork ICM Australia 
Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 66, [20]; A J Sweeney Pty Ltd v T W Hedley Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 390, (BC 
200407900, 5). 
144  (2002) 186 ALR 289. 
145  For a detailed discussion of this decision refer to J W Carter and A Stewart, ‘Interpretation, Good Faith 
and the “True Meaning” of Contracts: The Royal Botanic Decision’ (2002) 18 JCL 182. 
146  Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
147  (2002) 186 ALR 289, 301. 
148  [2005] VSCA 228. 
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implication as matter of law these decisions are separately considered as part of the 
section that follows. 
 
3.1.6 Difficulties with Implication as a Matter of Law  
 
As mentioned, in the period from 2001 to 2004 a number of Australian courts had 
held that good faith was implied, as a matter of law,149 in the performance and 
enforcement of a very broad class of contract, namely, commercial contracts per se.  
However, the validity of this approach has now been questioned openly.  To consider 
further what class of contract should attract the implied obligation of good faith, two 
key decisions from the New South Wales Court of Appeal warrant careful 
examination. 
 
The first decision is Burger King.150  After several years of disputes, Burger King Corp 
(‘BKC’), as franchisor, and Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd (‘HJ’), as franchisee, entered into 
four agreements, one of which was described as a Development Agreement.  The 
four agreements, together with the individual franchises for each of HJ’s stores, 
governed the parties’ contractual relationship including HJ’s development rights in 
Australia.  Under the terms of the Development Agreement, HJ was required to 
develop a total of at least four restaurants per year.  There was a provision allowing 
termination for breach and a requirement that 30 days notice be given in respect of 
any breach that was capable of cure. 
 
From 1993 BKC decided (as a matter of policy) to take a more active role in Australia 
with a view to reducing HJ’s role in the Australian market, if it could not remove it 
from the market altogether.151  Also, from 1993, disputes between BKC and HJ 
developed and intensified.  During 1994, some tripartite discussions took place with 
a view to establishing Hungry Jack’s outlets in Shell service stations.  However, after 
a further period of time, BKC commenced discussions to pursue a bipartite 
relationship with Shell, excluding HJ. 
 
In 1995 things came to a head when BKC took three steps that restricted HJ’s ability 
to develop.  First, BKC advised that it would not approve any further recruitment of 
third party franchisees (the so-called ‘third party freeze’).  Secondly, it withdrew 
financial approval and thirdly, it withdrew operational approval.152  These actions 
were critical as they imperilled HJ’s ability to comply with the stated development 
criterion.  In 1996 and 1997 BKC served notices of termination alleging, amongst 
other things, a failure to develop the requisite number of stores as prescribed by the 
Development Agreement.  Proceedings were then instituted by HJ principally dealing 
with BKC’s purported termination of the Development Agreement. 
 
At first instance, Rolfe J held that the notices of termination were invalid and that 
BKC had breached implied obligations of reasonableness and good faith contained 
                                                          
149  In Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187 the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Sheller, Beazley and Stein 
JJA) noted that there was increasing acceptance that a term of good faith was to be implied as a matter 
of law, which approach was considered to be correct: at [164].  See also P Finn, ‘Equity and 
Commercial Contracts: A Comment’ [2001] AMPLA Yearbook 414, 418. 
150  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
151  Ibid [223]. 
152  Ibid [188]. 
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in the Development Agreement.  BKC’s conduct had rendered worthless or nugatory, 
HJ’s enjoyment of the rights conferred by the contract.153  In effect, BKC wanted to 
take control of the Australian market in disregard of HJ’s rights.  To this end BKC 
had deliberately pursued a course of action to thwart the rights held by HJ under the 
Development Agreement in order to develop unhindered by its contractual 
arrangements with HJ.  Significant damages154 were awarded to HJ for the wrongful 
termination by BKC of the Development Agreement. 
 
BKC appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal (in a 
joint judgment) held, amongst other things, that the Development Agreement was 
subject to implied terms of cooperation, reasonableness and good faith.155  These 
implied terms were breached by BKC taking the three steps previously referred to, 
namely imposing the third party freeze and by withdrawing both financial and 
operational approval.156  Like Rolfe J at first instance, the Court of Appeal considered 
BKC’s actions to have rendered HJ’s contractual rights worthless or nugatory.157  In 
reaching its conclusion that there was an implied term of good faith, the Court of 
Appeal158 observed: 
 
This necessarily brief survey of the case law post Alcatel indicates that obligations of good 
faith and reasonableness will be more readily implied in standard form contracts, particularly if 
such contracts contain a general power of termination.  Clearly, however, the cases where 
these terms are to be implied are not limited to standard form agreements.  Alcatel itself, 
which involved a 50 year lease agreement of commercial premises, provides an example of a 
one off contract where such terms were implied.159 
 
As can be seen from this quotation, the Court of Appeal (in Burger King)160 cited 
Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella161 with evident approval.  In both instances the Court 
of Appeal was dealing with a commercial contract and, in both instances, the court 
was prepared to imply a term of good faith in contractual performance and 
enforcement.  Unfortunately, it seems the mere fact that a commercial contract was 
involved in both instances has resulted in these decisions being erroneously 
accepted as a precedent for a legally wider proposition.  The decision in Burger 
King162 was repeatedly cited by judges at first instance in New South Wales as 
authority for the proposition that a duty of good faith will be implied, as a matter of 
law, in all commercial contracts.163 
 
                                                          
153  Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd v Burger King Corporation [1999] NSWSC 1029, [273]. 
154  A$70,845,428. 
155  Being the three implied terms found by Rolfe J at first instance. 
156  This conduct of BKC also constituted a breach of the express terms of the Development Agreement. 
157  Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, [177]. 
158  After referring to decisions such as Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonalds Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 
and Garry Rogers Motors Aust Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-703. 
159  Burger King [2001] NSWCA 187, [163]. 
160  [2001] NSWCA 187.  
161  (1998) 44 NSWLR 349. 
162  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
163  See, eg, Apple Communications Ltd v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 635; State of New South 
Wales v Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 503; Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts 
Rep 90-143; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Spira (2002) 174 FLR 274; Commonwealth 
Development Bank of Australia Ltd v Cassegraine [2002] NSWSC 965; Softplay v Perpetual [2002] 
NSWSC 1059. 
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However, at no stage was this proposition expressly stated by the Court of Appeal164 
in either Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella165 or Burger King.166  Although the Court of 
Appeal in Burger King167 did state the two tests for implication of a contractual term 
as a matter of law,168 they merely seemed to satisfy themselves, in a very cursory 
manner, that the second test of necessity was met.169  The satisfaction (or otherwise) 
of the first test, that there should be a recognised class of contract, was not 
discussed.  The only comment made in this regard was that the contract in issue did 
not fall within the rubric of any traditional class of contract.170  The absence of any 
discussion of the satisfaction of the first test, and the limited and largely unhelpful 
discussion of the second test, militates against the view that this decision should be 
accepted as authority for the proposition that a duty of good faith will be implied, as a 
matter of law, in that class of contracts being commercial contracts per se. 
 
The veracity of this observation was confirmed by the later decision of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal171 in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd.172  
Mobile Innovations Ltd (‘Mobile’) had been appointed by Vodafone Pacific Ltd 
(‘Vodafone’) as a sole or exclusive direct marketing agent under a long term Agent 
Service Provider (‘ASP’) contract.  Amongst other things, the question arose whether 
Vodafone was under an implied obligation to act in good faith in exercising its 
powers under the ASP contract, specifically the power of determining target levels 
for the acquisition of subscribers.  Although the Court of Appeal was ultimately 
content to assume, expressly without deciding, that there was such an implied 
obligation,173 some extremely pertinent observations were made concerning the class 
of contracts carrying the implied term of good faith as a legal incident. 
 
In discussing the earlier decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Burger 
King,174 Giles JA175 observed that the decision fell short of, indeed rejected, treating 
commercial contracts as a class of contracts carrying the implied term as a legal 
incident.176  Giles JA then observed: 
 
 I do not think the law has yet gone so far as to say that commercial contracts are a class of 
contracts carrying the implied terms as a legal incident, and the width and indeterminacy of 
the class of contracts would make it a large step.177 (emphasis added) 
 
This was not the first time that judicial doubt has been expressed concerning the 
selection of the class ‘commercial contracts’ to carry the implied term of good faith as 
                                                          
164  As noted subsequently by a differently constituted New South Wales Court of Appeal in Vodafone 
Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [189], [191]. 
165  (1998) 44 NSWLR 349. 
166  [2001] NSWCA 187.  
167  Ibid. 
168  Ibid [165].  For a discussion of the individual requirements of both tests, see above 3.1.3. 
169  Ibid [167]. 
170  Ibid [166]. 
171  Giles, Sheller and Ipp JJA. 
172  [2004] NSWCA 15. 
173  Unless excluded by express provision or because inconsistent with the terms of the contract: ibid [191]. 
174  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
175  Sheller and Ipp JJA concurred with the judgment delivered by Giles JA. 
176  Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, [189]. 
177  Ibid [191]. 
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a legal incident.  In Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd178 Parker J similarly 
stated ‘I don’t find the notion of all commercial contracts particularly helpful or 
relevant.’179  At a more general level, the English Court of Appeal (albeit in the 
context of the distinction between implication in fact and implication in law) has also 
questioned whether a commercial relationship per se is a special relationship that 
justifies the implication of contractual terms as a matter of law.  In Mears v Safecar 
Security Ltd,180 ‘the Court of Appeal noted that when contracts establish a 
relationship that demands certain obligations’,181 these obligations will be imposed by 
law, rather than having regard to the business efficacy or officious bystander tests 
applicable to commercial contracts where there is no such relationship.182 
 
The decision in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd183 was significant for 
two reasons.  First, the New South Wales Court of Appeal184 was clearly seeking to 
distance itself from any suggestion that Burger King185 should be viewed as authority 
for the proposition that an implied obligation of good faith was a legal incident of all 
commercial contracts.  Secondly, the decision heralded the need for a careful 
consideration of contractual context when determining a class of contract that should 
attract the implied obligation of good faith as a legal incident.186 
 
As mentioned, the 2005 decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Esso Australia 
Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL187 signalled a change of judicial 
approach at least in Victoria.  Even if a term of good faith were to be implied as a 
matter of law, Warren CJ did not consider that the implication should be made as a 
matter of course: 
 
Ultimately, the interests of certainty in contractual activity should be interfered with only when 
the relationship between the parties is unbalanced and one party is at a substantial 
disadvantage, or is particularly vulnerable in the prevailing context.  Where commercial 
leviathans are contractually engaged, it is difficult to see that a duty of good faith will arise, 
leaving aside duties that might arise in a fiduciary relationship.188 
 
Later in the same decision, in expressing a preference for potential implication as a 
matter of fact, rather than law, Buchanan JA189 opined: 
 
I am reluctant to conclude that commercial contracts are a class of contracts carrying an 
implied term of good faith as a legal incident, so that an obligation of good faith applies 
indiscriminately to all the rights and powers conferred by a commercial contract.  It may, 
however, be appropriate in a particular case to import such an obligation to protect a 
vulnerable party from exploitative conduct which subverts the original purpose for which the 
                                                          
178  (2001) 24 WAR 382. 
179  Ibid [21]. 
180  [1983] 1 QB 54. 
181  Peden, above n 92, 148. 
182  Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] 1 QB 54, 78. 
183  [2004] NSWCA 15. 
184  A court which has championed the good faith cause. 
185  [2001] NSWCA 187. 
186  To ensure the class selected is not too broad in its width or indeterminant. 
187  [2005] VSCA 228. 
188  Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228, [4]. 
189  With the agreement of Warren CJ and Osborn AJA. 
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contract was made.  Implication in this fashion is perhaps ad hoc implication … rather than 
implication as a matter of law creating a legal incident of contracts of a certain type.190 
 
Following this decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in 2005, a number of recent 
Victorian decisions have eschewed implication of a good faith obligation as a matter 
of law in favour of considering the possibility of implication as a matter of fact.191  
This judicial approach is not confined to Victoria.192  More broadly, there have also 
been instances of the ad hoc implication of a good faith obligation being expressly 
predicated upon a finding of vulnerability193 or rejected in the absence of a finding of 
vulnerability.194  Unfortunately, the use of the term ‘vulnerable’ with its equitable 
connotations of an associated disadvantage immediately raises doctrinal issues of a 
further dimension namely the interplay between common law and equitable 
remedies.195  It is not within the scope of this article to comment further on this 
particular issue except to note existing criticism of approaches which seek to merge 
the equitable notion of unconscionability both at common law and in statute with the 
common law implied obligation of good faith196 or, alternatively, merge equitable 
rules for relief against forfeiture with the good faith obligation.197 
 
Even in New South Wales there is evidence of a change of heart in decisions from 
2005 and onwards.  Although made in an insurance context, the decision in CGU 
Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd v Garcia198 evidences greater judicial caution 
with the New South Wales Court of Appeal199 simply noting that the earlier New 
South Wales authorities did not establish that an implied term of good faith was 
applicable to every contract ‘or even into every aspect of a particular contract.’200 
 
This rather less adventurous approach201 is particularly apparent in single judge 
decisions in New South Wales after 2005.  For example, in Insight Oceania Pty Ltd v 
Philips Electronics Australia Ltd,202 Bergin J repeated the view that she had earlier 
expressed in Australian Hotel Assn (NSW) v TAB Ltd203 that commercial contracts 
are not a class of contracts that, have an implied obligation as a legal incident.204  
                                                          
190  Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228, [25]. 
191  See, e.g., Network Ltd v Speck [2009] VSC 235; Thong Guan Plastic and Paper Industries SDN BHD v 
Vicpac Industries Australia Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 11. 
192  See, e.g., Driveforce Pty Ltd v Gunns Ltd (No 3) [2010] TASSC 38. 
193  See, e.g., Berndale Securities Ltd v How Trading Pty Ltd (2010) 78 ACSR 218. 
194  See, e.g., Withham v Hough [2009] QSC 101; Felsink Pty Ltd v City of Maribyrnong [2010] VSC 110. 
195  The possibility of contract taking over from equity was not without precedent.  For a New South Wales 
allusion to this possibility, see, e.g., Giles JA in Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovation Ltd [2004] 
NSWCA 15, [217]. 
196  See, example, Elizabeth Peden, ‘When Common Law Trumps Equity: The Rise of Good Faith and 
Reasonableness and the Demise of Unconscionability’ (2005) 21 JCL 226. 
197  Brereton J has noted that ‘equity has crafted rules that surround the availability of relief against 
forfeiture in an appropriate case, a doctrine which would have been superfluous had the common law 
implied a “good faith” term in connection with the exercise of contractual rights of termination’: 
Hunter Valley Skydiving Centre Pty Ltd v Central Coast Aero Club Ltd [2008] NSWSC 539, [48]. 
198  [2007] NSWCA 193. 
199  Mason P, Hodgson JA and Santow JA. 
200  CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd v Garcia [2007] NSWCA 193, [132]. 
201  Gyles J has referred to the width of judicial approaches ranging from ‘cautious’ to ‘more adventurous’: 
Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 230 ALR 437, 498. 
202  [2008] NSWSC 710. 
203  [2006] NSWSC 293, [78]. 
204  Insight Oceania Pty Ltd v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd [2008] NSWSC 710, [175]. 
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However, Bergin J was prepared to imply certain good faith obligations as a matter 
of fact.205  In adopting this approach, Bergin J took comfort from the approach of 
Gyles J in Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd: 
 
The best way for a single judge to travel through this thicket is to concentrate upon the 
particular contractual provision in question, the particular contract, in the particular 
circumstances of the case.206 
 
In a similar manner, Bryson J in Reliance Developments (NSW) Pty Ltd v Lumley 
General Insurance Ltd207 cautioned that implication of a good faith obligation was not 
a matter of course and ‘takes place within the framework of the notion of necessity of 
the implication.’208  Bryson J again adopted this approach in R & J Lyons Family 
Settlement Pty Ltd v 155 Macquarie St Pty Ltd209 in determining that the relevant 
tests (including necessity) for a good faith obligation to be implied as a matter of fact 
were not made out.210 
 
While it is possible to discern the appeal of this sort of judicial approach when faced 
with a ‘bewildering variety of opinions’,211 the rejection of the possibility of an 
implication of good faith as a matter of law in favour of potential implication as a 
matter of fact presents its own doctrinal hurdles.  
 
3.1.7 Difficulties with Implication as a Matter of Fact 
 
In Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL,212 Warren CJ 
opined that the law relating to good faith had ‘travelled an almost full circle.’213  As 
part of this jurisprudential juxtaposition, there is a discernible judicial tendency to 
consider good faith as a term to be implied as a matter of fact, rather than law, if the 
implication is to be made at all.  The impact of this doctrinal shift warrants further 
discussion. 
 
When considering the potential for an obligation of good faith to be implied as a 
matter of fact, it must be remembered that a court will approach the task of 
implication of a contractual term on this basis with a degree of caution.  A term will 
not be implied simply because it may appear to be reasonable.  This generally 
cautious approach to implication as a matter of fact was reaffirmed by Kirby J in 
Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Pty Ltd:214 
 
Whatever may be the precise legal criterion for implying terms into a contract upon which the 
parties have not expressly agreed, it would always be necessary for a court of our legal 
tradition to be very cautious about the imposition on the parties of a term that, for themselves, 
                                                          
205  Ibid, [177] and [179]. 
206  Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 230 ALR 437, 499 [168]. 
207  [2008] NSWSC 172. 
208  Reliance Developments (NSW) Pty Ltd v Lumley General Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWSC 172, [51]. 
209  [2008] NSWSC 310. 
210  Ibid, [68]. 
211  Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 230 ALR 437, 498 [166]. 
212  [2005] VSCA 228. 
213  Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228, [2]. 
214  (2001) 185 ALR 335. 
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they had failed, omitted or refused to agree upon.  Such caution is inherent in the economic 
freedom to which the law of contract gives effect.215 
 
At a general level, the economic freedom that Kirby J refers to will often manifest 
itself by detailed contractual provisions that seek to regulate expressly all aspects of 
the contractual relationship.  In these circumstances the satisfaction of a number of 
the five requirements previously listed may be problematic.216  As noted by Loke, the 
close identification between terms implied in fact and the parties’ actual, but 
unstated, intentions permits only limited room for manoeuvre.217  Probably the 
greatest individual hurdle is that a term will not be implied ‘in fact’ where it is contrary 
to an express term of a contract.218 
 
For example, it may not be possible to imply a term of good faith based on business 
efficacy where the contract would be effective without it,219 where the term is not so 
obvious that it goes without saying220 or where the implication of the term would be 
inconsistent with an express term of a contract.  These potential difficulties in 
satisfying the requirements for an obligation of good faith to be implied, as a matter 
of fact, were first foreseen by Priestley JA in Renard221 and they have proven to be 
significant obstacles.222  The difficulty being, as Peden notes, that it will be difficult to 
satisfy the strict requirements of the business efficacy test in circumstances where 
the contract can ‘work’ if the parties perform their contractual obligations in their own 
interests.223 
 
In stark contrast, due to the different basis for implication, even the presence of an 
inconsistent, express, contractual term may not necessarily operate as an 
impediment to the implication of a term of good faith in contractual performance and 
enforcement, as a matter of law.224  Given this contrast, it is perhaps not surprising 
that there have been instances in the past where judges have implied a good faith 
obligation as a matter of law expressly due to ‘the difficulty of complying with the 
criteria for an implication in fact.’225  This serves as yet a further illustration of the 
doctrinal hurdles faced in Australia.  It would be a grave mistake to think that 
implication as a matter of fact is necessarily any more or less problematic than 
implication as a matter of law. 
 
                                                          
215  Ibid [161]. 
216  In the good faith context, see, eg, Overlook v Foxtel (2002) Aust Contracts Rep 90-143, [60]. 
217  A F H Loke, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Joint Ventures’ [1999] 
JBL 538, 547. 
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90-143 Barrett J quickly dismissed the suggestion that an implied term of good faith arose on the 
grounds of presumed intention or business efficacy: at [60].  The answer to the question whether, an 
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223  Peden, above n 92, 132. 
224  Bill Dixon, ‘Can the Common Law Obligation of Good Faith be Contractually Excluded?’ (2007) 35 
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225  Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94, [52] (Steytler J) as referred to by 
Peden, above n 92, 133. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
There is undoubtedly ‘a conceptual difficulty that can attend the concept of a duty of 
good faith’226 in Australia.  Unlike certain of its global counterparts, Australia does not 
have the benefit of a civil or commercial code, a Restatement, overarching principles 
or the like.  Without these doctrinal tools, as this article has highlighted, the implied 
term approach adopted by Australian courts to date to justify an implied obligation of 
good faith in contractual performance and enforcement has been problematic both in 
relation to implication as a matter of law and implication as a matter of fact.  
 
There is increasing recognition that the implication of a term of good faith ‘does not 
fit neatly into the structure of Australian contract law’227 which has been manifested 
by a growing reticence to imply an obligation of good faith.228  Judicial robustness 
has given away to judicial caution229 with this more cautious approach being 
reflected to some extent by a change in doctrinal direction since 2005.  This may be 
largely be seen to be a response to the doctrinal challenges posed by an implied 
term treatment of good faith coupled with a lack of direction from the High Court.  
While ‘the law in Australia is not settled as to the place of good faith in the law of 
contracts’230 and is still evolving,231 matters of doctrine loom large if the evolution is 
to proceed in a principled manner. 
 
In relation to the possible implication of an obligation of good faith in contractual 
performance and enforcement, as a matter of law, it is correct to observe that 
previous judicial pronouncements of good faith being implied as matter of law as a 
necessary incident of commercial contracts were ‘not supported by any doctrinal 
underpinning.’232  Unfortunately, apart from academic suggestion as to the 
appropriate class of contract to attract an implicit obligation of good faith,233 there is 
little evidence of judicial grappling with this issue and limited discussion of the test of 
‘necessity’. 
 
While there may be a superficial attractiveness in a ‘full circle’ resort to implication as 
a matter of fact, such an approach is saddled with its own doctrinal limitations.  As 
the number of decisions involving good faith claims continues to escalate,234 so the 
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hope grows that the doctrinal challenges involved will soon be grappled with by the 
High Court. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Rogan-Gardiner v Woolworths Ltd [No 2] [2010] WASC 290) and lending (see, e.g., National 
Australia Bank v McCourt [2010] WASC 237). 
